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Abstract 
This paper argues that even though EU policies in the DRC integrated different components of 
human security – namely human rights protection, the restoration of law and order, and 
effective multilateralism – in practice these policies have had mixed success in realizing the 
objective of human security. This can be explained by three main reasons: (i) EU policies are 
based on a number of premises about how peace and human security can best be achieved, but 
these premises are overly simplistic, and in most cases tend to overlook or are disconnected 
from complexities on the ground; (ii) since the end of the transition in 2006, the EU saw its 
influence as dominant diplomatic and conflict management actor gradually weakening, and has 
focused on its role as a development actor, with a specific focus on the implementation of 
technical projects rather than on the development of a strategic policy on the DRC; and (iii) there 
is a general lack of political will from Congolese state authorities to engage with donor strategies 
and to support initiatives that promote a genuine national reform. 
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Introduction 
It is the aspiration of the European Union to be a global peace and security actor 
(Manners, 2010). As the European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003 states, ‘Europe should 
be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world’ 
(European Commission, 2003:1). To respond to this ambition, the European Commission 
and Council have developed a multitude of approaches and instruments. Conflict 
prevention and crisis management are key objectives in its search for international 
security, which is based on the assumption that development is conditioned by peace 
and stability and on the recognition that peace, security and development are inherently 
connected and compounded by the imperative of good governance (Martinelli, 2006). 
One of the crises in which the EU has tried to be a dominant peace and security broker 
is the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo. For some observers, this conflict has 
become ‘a laboratory for EU crisis management’ (Knutsen, 2009: 456). It is in the DRC 
that the EU conducted its first CSDP intervention outside of Europe, setting important 
precedents for the development of future EU engagements in Africa. Overall five 
different CSDP interventions have been undertaken since 2003: ARTEMIS, EUFOR DR 
Congo, EUSEC DR Congo, EUPOL Kinshasa and EUPOL DR Congo. These make the DRC 
the recipient of the largest number of EU CSDP missions in one single country. In 
addition, the EU has mobilized a variety of development, democracy promotion, and 
humanitarian assistance instruments in support of its conflict management and 
stabilization objectives in the DRC. Between 2002 and 2013, European Development 
Fund (EDF) budgets increased from €120 million to €726 million (€901 million if thematic 
budget lines such as the Stability Fund, Food Facility, and environment are also 
included). In 2013, this made the DRC the primary beneficiary of EU development 
funding in Sub-Saharan Africa and placed the EU amongst the top three donors in the 
DRC.1 
While EU policies in the DRC have played a significant role in road testing and developing 
the EU’s crisis management capabilities, its positive contribution to improving 
conditions on the ground in the DRC is less evident (Piccolino, 2010). This paper argues 
that although EU policies in the DRC have integrated different components of human 
security, in practice these policies have had mixed success in achieving the latter. This 
can be explained by three interrelated factors: (i) EU policies are based on a number of 
premises about how peace and human security can best be achieved, which tend to 
overlook or are disconnected from complexities on the ground. While mainly focused 
on building formal state structures, EU strategies have not been able to reverse existing 
governance conditions and practices, and have not focused on structurally changing the 
extractive character of the politico-administrative system of the Congo; (ii) since the end 
of the transition in 2006, the EU has seen its influence as a diplomatic and conflict 
management actor gradually weaken and has focused on its role as a development 
actor, with a specific focus on the implementation of technical projects rather than on 
                                                          
1 Based on OECD-DAC figures, available at http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/data.htm 
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the development of a coherent political strategy on the DRC; (iii) there is a general lack 
of political will from Congolese state authorities to engage with donor strategies and to 
support initiatives that promote a genuine national reform.  
This paper starts with a brief account of the Congolese crises. The second section 
provides an overview of the different components of the EU policy in the DRC, and then 
goes on to discuss its connection to a human security agenda. In the fourth part of the 
paper we present a number of challenges and constraining factors which explain the 
limited impact of EU policies in producing change in the DRC, and critically reflect on the 
EU as a peace and security actor in the DRC. Finally, in the concluding section we put 
forward some lessons that can be drawn from the EU’s experience in the DRC, which 
may help guide the EU’s future actions in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
The Congo Crises 
The Congo crises are rooted in a complex interplay of local, national and regional 
dynamics. Decades of patrimonial rule and economic mismanagement, and 
international and local pressure for democracy in the early 1990s, caused a deep political 
crisis and the near collapse of the Mobutu regime. In the eastern parts of the country, 
unresolved local issues of citizenship and land access added additional layers to the crisis 
and triggered a first round of armed mobilization. A mass exodus into the DRC (then 
called Zaire) of Burundian and Rwandan Hutu refugees as a result of the Burundian civil 
war in 1993 and the Rwandan genocide, intensified instability in eastern Congo. In 1996, 
the presence of the former Rwandan army (ex-FAR) and militias in these refugee camps 
and of Ugandan rebel movements in the DRC triggered an armed intervention of 
neighboring countries Uganda and Rwanda and the creation of a regional coalition. This 
coalition ousted Mobutu from power in May 1997. After the new Congolese president 
Kabila expelled his former Ugandan and Rwandan military allies in 1998, a second war 
broke out which would soon result in a high level of military fragmentation in the east. 
A first peace deal, concluded in Lusaka in 1999, had little impact and only served to 
entrench the political and military stalemate.  
Despite international efforts to keep the peace process on track, it was only after Joseph 
Kabila replaced his father in early 2001 (who was killed by one of his guards) that a 
political opening emerged. Peace agreements were concluded one year later with 
Rwanda and Uganda, which paved the way for the progressive withdrawal of their 
troops from eastern Congo. In December 2002, an all-inclusive peace accord was also 
concluded between the different Congolese warring factions and political actors, which 
included a political framework for a transition process that allowed for maximum 
inclusivity of political and military actors. Following this, a transitional government was 
installed that was based on a power sharing between the main warring parties. This 
government faced the arduous task of unifying the national territory, establishing a new 
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legal and institutional framework, rebuilding state authority, preparing for general 
elections, and reforming the security sector. Several internationally supported initiatives 
were set up to support the peace process and promote regional stability. These included 
the ‘Comité international de l’accompagnement de la transition’ (CIAT), which was 
tasked with assisting and supervising the transition process and the transitional 
government. The CIAT was composed of various bilateral partners, the European Union, 
the African Union and the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC). Other international 
accompanying initiatives included the World Bank’s ‘Multi-Country Demobilization and 
Reintegration Program’ (MDRP) and the ‘International Conference on the Great Lakes 
Region’ (ICGLR), a regional platform of individual states that had to reestablish regional 
cooperation.  
Despite the peace accord and the installation of the transition government, insecurity in 
eastern DRC persisted. While a large number of militia combatants were either 
demobilized or integrated in the newly created Congolese army, their departure from 
their strongholds in many areas created a security void, with the Congolese army not 
yet fully deployed in these areas. Other groups resisted reintegration and remained 
operational in their previous areas of control. The peace process also had little to no 
effect on the Rwandan Hutu militia (FLDR), which maintained its cooperation with non-
integrated militias and continued to pose a major threat to local security in large parts 
of the Kivu provinces. The slow pace of the integration process; the lack of attention to 
local unresolved land-access disputes, the citizenship issue, and inter- and intra-
community disputes over political, military or economic influence; competition over the 
control of mineral exploitation and trading networks; the nature of the state and the 
lack of progress in political reform and decentralization; and regional power politics all 
explain the continued violence in the Kivu provinces after the start of the transition 
process. 
The precarious security conditions in the east were also highlighted by a number of new 
crises that revealed the fragility of international peacekeeping and stabilization efforts. 
A first crisis broke out in the Ituri District, where, since 1999, several militias had been 
involved in local conflicts over land, political power and economic control. When in May 
2003 Ugandan troops left this region, renewed fighting broke out between these groups, 
causing a major humanitarian crisis in the city of Bunia. This crisis brought ‘the small and 
poorly equipped local UN contingent on the brink of a failure that could seriously 
compromise the image of the UN and the peace process at large’ (Piccolino, 2010:125). 
In order to allow MONUC to reinforce its capabilities and revise its mandate, the UN 
Security Council asked for the deployment of an emergency force, which led to the 
launch of the EU’s Artemis operation. But even the increase in MONUC’s troop numbers 
and strengthening of its use of force mandate failed to prevent an attack against the 
provincial capital Bukavu (South Kivu) in 2004 by former Tutsi rebels who had deserted 
from the newly formed national army (FARDC). This caused a major blow to the image 
of the UN peacekeeping force, as well as its inability to provide protection to civilians in 
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remote areas that continued to be prone to militia attacks. 
The first democratic elections in 2006 also did not put an end to insecurity in eastern 
DRC. These elections received significant international political, financial and logistical 
support, including a EUFOR mission to provide protection, and could be considered as a 
milestone of the peace process. In the east, however, these elections sparked instability 
as they considerably reduced the power of wartime networks and former rebel 
movements. Fears of further marginalization were most widespread within the Tutsi-
community and triggered the reconstitution of the Tutsi-part of the RCD-Goma rebel 
group, under the command of General Nkunda. His group, called the CNDP, quickly 
became the most powerful armed actor in the Kivu-provinces and was able to 
consolidate its political, military and economic control, partly with support from 
Rwanda. Efforts by the Congolese army to deal with this new security threat all ended 
in military defeats, leaving no other option to the Kinshasa government than to attempt 
to integrate the armed group into the FARDC, through different processes of military 
brassage and mixage. In addition, in 2008 the Amani peace process was launched with 
the aim of kick-starting a new inclusive peace process in the east, including the 
demobilization of Kivu-based militias. However, as a result of mis-incentives created by 
the Amani peace talks themselves, the overall lack of progress in the DDR process, and 
difficulties in integrating former rebel commanders into the FARDC command chain, the 
peace process ended in new rounds of armed mobilization. 
There was renewed hope in early 2009 that the conflict could finally be resolved. 
Negotiations between Rwanda and the DRC in December 2008 led to the announcement 
of an agreement on a joint military offensive against the FDLR. Several military 
operations against the FDLR followed but failed to eliminate the group. In January 2009, 
the CNDP reached an agreement with Kinshasa on the immediate cessation of hostilities 
and on a rapid integration of its forces in the Congolese army. Prior to the 2011 
presidential and parliamentary elections though, the Kinshasa government tried to 
reduce the power of the ex-CNDP and its networks. A ban on the export of natural 
resources limiting the income flows of the group was imposed, and attempts were made 
to deploy ex-CNDP troops outside of the Kivus. Furthermore, Kinshasa tried to cut the 
parallel chains of command through a reform of the FARDC and the transformation of 
brigades into regiments. In response, part of the former CNDP troops deserted the army 
and created the M-23 rebel movement, which in November 2012 managed to 
temporarily seize control of the city of Goma. This new escalation of violence set in 
motion renewed international efforts to restore peace and stability, with peace talks 
initiated by the ICGLR and SADC. In 2013 this led to the creation of the International 
Brigade to dismantle a multitude of armed groups in eastern DRC. The ‘Peace, Security 
and Cooperation Framework Agreement’ was also signed in Addis Ababa by members 
of the international community, including the ICGLR, African Union, SADC and United 
Nations. This Framework was meant to bring an end to the foreign backing of Congolese 
armed groups and to foster a comprehensive reform of Congolese state institutions, 
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including the national army, police and judicial sector. A newly appointed United Nations 
Special Envoy for the Great Lakes was appointed to oversee the implementation of the 
framework agreements.    
Once again though, these peace efforts only had a limited success on the ground. A 
recent mapping exercise estimates that more than 70 armed groups remain active today 
in eastern DRC, with more than 1.6 million people still displaced (Stearns and Vogel, 
2015). Vast rural areas continue to be prone to armed group activities, including acts of 
violence, taxation and extortion. Different approaches to stabilization and peace of the 
Congolese government and the international community, including demobilization, 
security sector and institutional reform, have had meagre results (Stearns and Vogel, 
2015). Even more, peace efforts have generally been an additional opportunity to revive 
or reinforce existing armed structures, and have set in motion new claims to political, 
military, and economic power. Badly designed strategies to deal with armed groups have 
even added new layers of conflict, as ‘the strategy of power sharing and institution 
building in the DRC has slowly but steadily become constitutive of a dialectic of 
structural violence and privatized governance that forms an essential impediment to 
genuine change’ (Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers, 2009: 484). The prospect of new 
elections (scheduled for 2016) is a clear illustration of these dynamics. While in the east 
there is a further democratization of militarized politics, with a mobilization of violence 
as a crucial part of power strategies and struggles, in the capital the ruling regime is 
trying to manipulate the electoral process to stay in power.  
 
The EU in the DRC: Pursuing a comprehensive approach  
The DRC is a historical partner of the EU, with relations between the European 
Commission and the DRC dating back to the first European Development Fund in 
1958/59. While direct development cooperation was suspended between 1992 and 
2002 as a result of a growing democratic deficit and the outbreak of war, since 2002 the 
EU’s financial and political engagement in the DRC has grown exponentially. The EU’s 
significant engagement in the DRC can be explained by the scale and human costs of the 
recurring crises that have affected the country, and by the proactive role played by 
certain EU member states, in particular Belgium and France, in placing and keeping the 
DRC on the EU’s agenda. But EU engagement in the DRC also reflects the EU’s growing 
emphasis on mobilizing its aid and external relations policies to support conflict 
prevention and management in vulnerable countries, and in particular in Africa (Olsen, 
2012). Within this context, the EU has strived to pursue a comprehensive approach to 
the crisis in the DRC. Firstly, by mobilizing both its civilian and military instruments, and 
secondly, by focusing on the interlocking political, economic and security dimensions of 
the political and security crises in the DRC. The strategic objective pursued by the EU in 
the DRC has been to promote peace and democracy by supporting the stabilization and 
reconstruction of the country. To this end, it has drawn on a broad set of instruments: 
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humanitarian assistance, development aid, democracy and human rights support, and 
its Common Foreign and Security Policy (including the Common Security and Defense 
Policy).  
As a first line of response to the protracted emergency situation in the DRC, the EU has 
disbursed extensive humanitarian assistance. The EU institutions have consistently 
ranked amongst the top three donors of humanitarian assistance in the DRC, alongside 
the UK and the US. This assistance has been primarily geared towards support for IDPs 
and refugees (including refugees from neighboring countries), and responding to acute 
malnutrition crises and epidemics throughout the country. The EU also operates a 
humanitarian air service, ECHO Flight, to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance to remote areas where road infrastructures are either unavailable or unsafe.  
From 2002 onwards, the EU has pursued a parallel track of mobilizing its development 
aid to support the reconstruction of the country. Its areas of concentration have been 
the reconstruction of the health sector, infrastructure rehabilitation (in particular 
transport), and improved governance or ‘politico-institutional reconstruction’ (through 
support for the transition process, the reinforcement of state institutions, the justice 
and security sectors, public finances, and the decentralization process).  In complement 
to this, the EU has mobilized its resources to support election processes in the DRC, 
through funding support for the organization and securitization of the elections and the 
deployment of electoral observation missions. This was particularly the case for the 
2006 electoral process, with over half of the $430 million budget funded by the EU and 
its member states. Levels of EU funding for the 2011 elections and upcoming elections 
in 2016 has however been lower. Through its European Instrument for Democracy and 
Human Rights, the EU has furthermore supported projects, implemented by civil society 
partners, to promote the rule of law, human rights protections, and political 
participation. Projects have included support for torture victims, independent local 
media, civic education, citizen participation in local governance, and the fight against 
impunity (EIDHR, 2011). 
Lastly, the EU undertook five CSDP missions in the DRC, two military missions (Artemis 
and EUFOR DR Congo) and three civilian missions (EUPOL Kinshasa, EUPOL DR Congo, 
and EUSEC DR Congo). Both military missions were temporally and geographically 
circumscribed deployments undertaken at the request of the UN to respond to an 
immediate crisis situation. Following a dramatic deterioration of violence in the eastern 
Ituri district, the 2,000-strong French-led Operation Artemis, the EU’s first ever CSDP 
mission outside of its immediate neighborhood, was deployed from 12 June to 1 
September 2013 in Bunia. Its mandate was to contribute to the stabilization of security 
conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia, as well as to 
protect Bunia airport, IDP camps and, if necessary, civilian populations and UN and 
humanitarian personnel (UN resolution 1484). After 1 September, Artemis was relieved 
by the newly reinforced UN Ituri brigade. In 2006, the EU deployed a second military 
mission, EUFOR DR Congo, from 12 June to 30 November. Its mandate was to assist the 
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Congolese police and army and the UN mission (MONUC) in securing the elections. Its 
role was to support the UN ‘in case MONUC faces serious difficulties in fulfilling its 
mandate’, secure Kinshasa airport, contribute to the protection of civilians under 
imminent threat of physical violence, and to carry out evacuation operations (UN 
resolution 1671). In contrast to Artemis, which was fully deployed in theatre, EUFOR DR 
Congo only had a small advance force deployed on the ground in Kinshasa. The majority 
of the EUFOR force was made up of reserve troops based in Gabon and Germany (which 
was the framework nation of the mission). 
In contrast to the EU’s military missions, which represented short-term emergency 
responses, the three civilian missions were deployed with longer-term institutional 
reform purposes in mind. The two EUPOL missions were aimed at strengthening the 
Congolese police forces. EUPOL Kinshasa, in operation from April 2005 to December 
2006, was established to provide support to the newly created Integrated Police Unit 
that was tasked with securing the transition institutions and the elections.  In addition, 
the mission provided assistance for the organization of a census of the national police 
(Police Nationale Congolaise, PNC) and for training provisions. It was followed by the 
EUPOL DR Congo mission, in operation from July 2007 to December 2014, which was 
given a broader mandate to support the police reform process through the delivery of 
training and assistance in the conceptualization of the police reform process. EUSEC DR 
Congo, in turn, was set up in June 2005 to provide advice and assistance to the 
Congolese authorities responsible for security sector reform. While its initial mandate 
was to support the army integration process (the 2003 peace agreement provided for 
the constitution of a new national army through the integration of combatants from the 
rebel groups into the Kabila loyalist army), EUSEC’s key contributions have been the 
creation of a new chain of payment to reduce embezzlement of soldier’s salaries, the 
modernization of military administration and human resource management, and the 
rehabilitation of armories. 
 
A flawed EU human security approach in the DRC 
The EU’s policies in the DRC have integrated components of human security, as 
conceptualized in the 2004 Barcelona Report setting out a Human Security Doctrine for 
Europe. Although EU official discourse did not frame its interventions in the DRC in the 
language of human security, the approach it has adopted broadly aligns with the idea of 
human security. This is, for instance, reflected in the EU’s combined use of civil and 
military approaches to security, the fact that its interventions were geared towards 
improving the physical and material security of individuals, and that it prioritized conflict 
prevention over the conduct of war. That is, of course, not to say that human security 
has been the sole or even primary motivation for EU policies in the DRC. In particular, 
the EU’s desire to deploy CSDP missions in the DRC were very much driven by political 
and institutional considerations, namely projecting the role of the EU as a global actor, 
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asserting its military autonomy from NATO, and ‘testing out’ the EU’s new conflict 
management capabilities (Gegout, 2005; Koops, 2011; Piccolino, 2010). 
Notwithstanding, EU policies in the DRC have also been oriented towards the realization 
of certain human security objectives such as human rights protection and the 
restoration of law and order. But, as will be shown in this section, while on paper EU 
policies in the DRC were geared towards these human security objectives, its ability in 
practice to effectively achieve improved physical and material security for individuals 
has been mixed. Even where EU actions directly contributed to human security (ex: 
Artemis), they have mostly had a short-term rather than a sustainable effect. 
Human rights protection 
The promotion and protection of human rights has formed part of the EU’s declared 
policy objectives in the DRC, and was formally included in the mandate of its CSDP 
missions. Artemis and EUFOR were expressly tasked with the protection of civilians 
under threat of attack. Artemis, in particular, effectively contributed to strengthening 
civilian protection on the ground, in no small part due to the Force commander’s resolve 
to use deadly force to make Bunia and a 10-km zone around the town a no-arms area. 
A human rights agenda was, in turn, integrated in the EUFOR mission through the 
appointment of a specific human rights adviser, the creation of a human rights 
monitoring system, and the provision of human rights training to its own soldiers 
(Martin, 2007: 72). Furthermore, EUPOL and EUSEC, as part of their role in advising the 
Congolese authorities on police and army reform, were mandated to ‘promote policies 
compatible with human rights and international humanitarian law’ (Council Joint Action 
2005/355/CFSP; Council Joint Action 2007/405/CFSP). In 2009, the mandate of EUPOL 
was expanded to also include the fight against sexual violence and impunity (Council 
Joint Action 2009/769/CFSP). EUPOL also strongly advocated for the concept of 
proximity policing within the PNC as a means to improve police-citizen relations 
(Justaert 2012: 224), and through this contribute to strengthening human rights 
protection. In addition, the EU’s humanitarian assistance has focused not only on the 
provision of relief but also expressly included the pursuit of protection activities, such 
as assistance to victims of sexual based gender-violence, child protection, and 
encouraging the establishment of assistance projects in isolated areas (‘protection by 
presence’). Lastly, in its Country Strategy Papers and Council Conclusions on the DRC, 
the EU has on repeated occasions expressed its commitment to combatting impunity for 
human rights abuses and its support for the International Criminal Court’s investigations 
in the DRC (Council Conclusion 10573/04, 14 June 2004; Council Conclusion 9375/06, 15 
May 2006). 
This formal commitment though to human rights protection has not sufficiently 
translated into an improved human rights situation on the ground. While the reason for 
this cannot solely be blamed on the EU – persistent insecurity in eastern Congo, the 
nature of rebel-military integration processes, and a lack of domestic political will to 
combat impunity are all key explanatory factors – it is possible to point at two important 
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shortcomings of EU policies in the DRC. Firstly, the restricted and short-term mandates 
of Artemis and EUFOR have significantly limited their impact on the ground and ability 
to deliver human rights protection, especially over the longer term. For instance, 
Artemis’ geographically limited deployment to Bunia meant it failed to impact violence 
in the rest of Ituri. Even the improved security situation in Bunia was mostly cosmetic 
and did not prevent the resumption of violence after the mission’s withdrawal, which is 
hardly surprising considering the mission was only on the ground for three months. As 
Morsut (2009: 264) observes: ‘the time limitation left Bunia as a 'weapons-invisible' 
zone, rather than a 'weapons-free zone'’. The EU has thus demonstrated a weak 
commitment to mobilizing credible military force to enforce human rights protection. 
Secondly, the EU has tended to adopt a ‘soft’, mostly declaratory approach to the human 
rights and impunity problem in the DRC. It has been reluctant to consistently pressure 
the Congolese authorities on rampant human rights abuses, particularly during the 
transition years when concerns with stabilization dominated. While the EU has been a 
strong advocate on ending SGBV in the DRC, it has been much less vocal and active on 
other pressing human rights concerns, such as arbitrary detentions and the protection 
of human rights defenders. Moreover, the EU has struggled to integrate the fights 
against impunity within its broader reform policies in the DRC, particularly with regards 
to SSR and DDR. While resistance by Congolese actors to such efforts constituted an 
important impediment, the EU’s decision to focus on a technical, capacity-building 
approach and eschew a more political engagement on security and human rights issues 
also limited its impact in terms of human rights protection. 
Restoration of law and order 
EU policies in the DRC have strongly prioritized the reform of the security forces (police 
and army) and the rehabilitation of the justice sector. These were seen as important 
preconditions for the restoration of state authority and law and order, and therefore 
the promotion of peace and democracy. Effective security and justice systems were seen 
as central to improving the physical security of civilians and reducing state predation 
against the population. Alongside the EUSEC and EUPOL missions, the EU also engaged 
in justice sector reform. It undertook an audit of the justice sector in 2004 and was a 
driving force behind the creation of a Comité Mixte de Justice, a donor-government 
coordination mechanism to support domestic judicial reform. It further set up justice 
reconstruction projects, first in Bunia in 2004, and which was later expanded to the €15 
million Rejusco (Restauration de la justice à l’est du Congo) project. The EU also invested 
€20 million in court rehabilitation projects in the western provinces of Bandundu, Bas-
Congo, and Kinshasa, and provided funding for the mobile court project aimed at 
improving access to justice in remote and conflict-affected areas in eastern Congo.  
EU policies in the security and justice sectors have made important achievements in 
specific areas – such as the rehabilitation of courts and armouries, reforming the chain 
of payment in the army, and capacity-building of judicial officials. Particularly in the 
justice sector, it is clear that EU engagement (alongside that of other donors) has been 
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a key in pushing forwards judicial reforms, resulting in the adoption of new legislation 
and the provision of increased resources to the justice sector (Vircoulon 2009). This has 
contributed to a progressive increase and improvement of trials in domestic courts, 
particularly with regards to gender violence (Lake, 2014). However, on a broader scale, 
improvements in law and order are, at best, very modest throughout the DRC. Important 
systemic weaknesses persist, such as poor human rights practices by the security forces, 
and limited access to justice. Furthermore, ‘the reform of the legal system did little or 
nothing to stem corruption, to mitigate the delays in cases coming to trial, to address 
the low number of judgments executed or to make the functioning of the legal system 
more transparent to the people’ (Rubbers & Gallez 2012: 84). Users still have to deal 
with a justice system that is experienced as driven by corruption, predation and 
coercion, with outcomes of court cases being unpredictable, unfair and very expensive. 
Because EU reform policies have tended to be compartmentalized and fragmented – for 
instance, police reform efforts have only focused on a few PNC units while Rejusco was 
heavily oriented towards infrastructure projects – their effects have mostly been 
localized. Also, these policies have struggled to give impulse to broader and deeper 
reforms. In practice, the EU has furthermore struggled to build effective bridges 
between the justice and security components of its interventions, further constraining 
the impact of its policies (Davis 2015). In light of the recent drawdown of its security and 
justice reform missions, it further remains to be seen if EU reforms will manage to have 
a sustainable impact. The heavy-handed police response to protests in Kinshasa and 
Goma in early 2015, and during the crime control Likofi Operation in 2014, as well as 
reports that some courts rehabilitated under the Rejusco project have already been 
abandoned as they were poorly constructed and did not respond to operational needs, 
raises significant concerns. 
 
Try and Fail? Constraints of the EU security and peace policies in the DRC  
Different reasons explain the limited impact of EU policies on human security in DRC. 
First, EU policies rely on a number of premises about how peace and human security 
should be achieved. These premises fail to recognize the complexity of the larger context 
of intervention and are largely disconnected from realities on the ground. EU policies so 
far have prioritized state-building, which was founded on the understanding that state 
failure is the cause of conflict in DRC. This explains the EU focus on the reconstruction 
of state capacity (to deliver services and security), on improving management and 
accountability of state institutions, and on the organization of free and fair elections. 
However, in the case of the DRC, EU and other donor resources seem to have supported 
the consolidation of a neo-patrimonial system: ‘the EU is focused on state-building in a 
context where there is no state to build’ but where instead there exists a ‘highly 
dysfunctional and kleptocratic Congolese quasi-state’ ruled by an elite driven by 
personal interests (Froitzheim et al, 2011: 65). EU strategies have not been able to 
reverse existing governance conditions and practices, and have not focused on 
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structurally changing the extractive character of the politico-administrative system of 
the Congo. Because of structural and sociocultural constraints on the ground, such as 
the dominance of practices of extortion and predation, competing structures and 
sources of authority, and the existence of different networks of patronage and political 
and economic control, EU reform policies have struggled to improve not only the formal 
but also the informal legitimacy, or broader societal acceptance, of state institutions. 
Even more, EU policies risk having an opposite effect and reinforce the capture of state 
structures by domestic political elites.  
A clear example is the reform of the security sector, which did not reverse the extractive 
character of security services even if several programmes tried to limit the direct control 
of commanders over resources and cut patronage links between commanders and 
recruits, both in the police and the army. International interventions for the purpose of 
providing security cannot be justified à priori. Instead these require legitimacy among 
its supposed beneficiaries. Yet, despite EU and other donor strategies, security services 
continue to exploit their authority to levy unofficial fines, taxes, and fees in part due to 
the embezzlements of resources by their superiors. In many cases, these services de 
facto constitute a security risk themselves rather than providing protection and security. 
Because of this complicity of the security forces in the persistence of insecurity, people 
mistrust and feel increasingly abandoned by the state. The omnipresent popular reflex 
of self-protection echoes a long tradition of ‘fending-for-yourself’ in the DRC, which is 
reinforced in the current context. Some of these popular responses today are being 
institutionalised or supported by donor strategies and state policies, thus reinforcing a 
context of multi-layered security arrangements (Baker, 2010). The risk of such a ‘multi-
layered approach’ is that it may contribute to a further fragmentation of the landscape 
of security provision, with a negative longer-term effect on security conditions 
(Vlassenroot, Hoffmann and Büscher: 2015). 
The reasons for the persistence of such practices are diverse and complex and it has to 
be recognised that the EU’s ability to produce a transformation at this level is inherently 
limited, due to a combination of political and resource constraints. Notwithstanding, the 
EU’s focus on state- and capacity-building has contributed to limiting its ability to 
produce change because it underestimates the complex nature of political and 
institutional change in the DRC. The focus on capacity-building relies on the assumption 
that formal institutional and legislative changes equate with changes in institutional 
practices and individual behaviour, thereby discounting the role of political factors or 
institutional culture in maintaining poor governance and abusive behaviour. For 
instance, corruption is not merely driven by basic economic needs but also serves 
broader political and strategic interests geared towards maintaining the ruling regime 
in power. Corruption is thus not a ‘dysfunction’ but rather serves a clear political 
function within the Congolese state. Reform policies that only focus on changes in 
capabilities and material conditions are unlikely to produce wider systemic change. 
There is also a risk that policies focused on capacity-building rather than genuine reform 
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will be misappropriated by domestic elites to reinforce their own positions. Particularly 
in the security sector this runs the risk of consolidating certain power configurations and 
increasing the ability of security forces to commit abuses (Davis 2015: 111, Rayroux and 
Willen 2014: 38). The EU’s focus on stabilization (as reflected by its prioritization of 
elections and political accommodation) has further heightened this problem. 
A second factor which has constrained the effect of EU policies on the ground is the 
ambivalent and progressively waning role of the EU as a diplomatic actor in the DRC. 
Immediately following the conclusion of the 2003 comprehensive peace agreement and 
throughout the political transition process, the EU enjoyed a certain degree of political 
influence. This was in part linked to the credibility it enjoyed in Kinshasa as a result of 
the resumption of its development cooperation, its large financial contribution to the 
electoral process, its membership in the CIAT, and the initially very active role played by 
the EU Special Representative. However, since 2006 the EU has seen its role and 
influence as a diplomatic and conflict management actor in the DRC progressively 
decline, while joint donor-strategies on strategic priorities have little by little 
disappeared. Despite the variety of instruments available to the EU, allowing it to play a 
significant role throughout the life cycle of a crisis - before the crisis with conflict-
prevention, during a crisis through its crisis-management tools, such as military 
deployments, diplomatic pressure and humanitarian intervention, and after the crisis 
with long-term development and peace-building policies (Hoebeke et al, 2006; 
Martinelli, 2006) – today the EU is no longer ‘perceived as a credible actor in African 
conflict management’ (Gegout, 2009: 403). 
An important factor here has been the absence of a comprehensive political strategy on 
the part of the EU towards the DRC (Piccolino 2010: 136). As highlighted earlier in the 
report, the EU’s approach has been fragmented across an array of technical issue areas. 
This has made it difficult for the EU to profile itself as a credible diplomatic actor, 
especially as it has on occasion also had to contend with disagreements between EU 
member states about which policy to pursue in the DRC. This has most clearly come to 
the fore in discussions about the deployment of CSDP missions in the DRC. While 
strongly supported by France and Belgium, such missions have faced reluctance on the 
part of countries such as Germany and the UK, and even indifference on the part of other 
states. This resulted in a curtailment of the scope and capabilities of certain missions 
(this was particularly the case of EUFOR Congo) or the outright failure to set up a mission 
following the outbreak of a new major security crisis in the North Kivu province in 2008. 
Such disagreements have thus hampered the ability of the EU to deploy strong and 
credible missions. 
At the same time, the EU’s visibility as a diplomatic actor has strongly depended on the 
activism of countries such as France or Belgium, and of high-profile individuals such as 
the EUSRs Aldo Ajello and Roeland van de Geer or EU Commissioner Louis Michel. The 
abolition of the position of EUSR for the Great Lakes in 2011 is therefore particularly 
problematic. Although this function has been taken over by the Senior Coordinator for 
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the Great Lakes region within the EEAS, the Coordinator has so far not been able to 
mobilize the same level of leverage as the EUSRs did (which has not been helped by the 
fact that he has had to cumulate the role of Senior Coordinator with his role as Director 
for the Horn of Africa, East & Southern Africa, and the Indian Ocean), thereby further 
reducing political access and the EU capacity to mediate and manage conflict. While the 
EU did involve itself in the Goma process (2008) and the EUPOL and EUSEC missions 
were given a mandate to support the implementation of the agreement, its role was 
mostly secondary and it has not been involved in further processes aimed at addressing 
the conflict in eastern DRC (Davis 2015). While this partly results from increasing 
attempts on the part of the Congolese authorities to sidestep external involvement 
(whether it be by the EU, the UN, or Western bilateral donors) in political and security 
crises in the country, there is also a growing political disengagement on the EU’s part 
from the DRC (though its development assistance to the DRC remains high) as a result 
of growing disillusion with the lack of progress achieved in the DRC and the emergence 
of newer security crises that are of greater strategic importance to the EU. 
Lastly, domestic political constraints have also played an important role in curtailing the 
effects and sustainable impacts of EU policies. The absence of political will for reform, 
weak capacities within the Congolese administration, and frequent changes in 
government ministers have made it difficult for the EU to give an impulse to broader 
and sustainable reforms. The limited political will on the part of the Congolese state 
authorities to engage in donor-driven/supported interventions and to implement 
genuine national reform policies have been particularly problematic. It has limited 
national appropriation of EU-initiated reform processes and created significant 
blockages in the implementation of reforms, particularly in the security sector. As the 
former head of EUPOL Jean-Paul Rikir observed, ‘the political context in the DRC exerts 
a significant influence on the degree of uneven appropriation [of reforms] by the 
Congolese authorities’ (cited in Plauchut 2015: 10). In such a context, there is only so 
much EU policies can achieve in terms of improving governance and human security 
conditions. Moreover, the case of the DRC exemplifies the challenges in promoting 
governance change and reforms, particularly in the security sector, in an unstable 
political environment and while armed conflict is ongoing. Because domestic elites and 
armed groups are still vying for power and control over the state, the political stakes 
involved in security sector reform are incredibly high, and risk creating dynamics of 
resistance or misappropriation of externally driven reform efforts. 
 
Drawing Lessons from EU interventions in the DRC 
While EU policies in the DRC have achieved some important successes, such as the short-
term shoring up of security provisions through its CSDP missions at critical times of 
(potential) instability, or providing key stimulus and resources for judicial reforms, it 
should also be acknowledged that it has struggled to produce structural and sustainable 
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changes, particularly in the security sector. Realism impels us to recognize that outside 
actors such as the EU cannot produce or create changes in deeply entrenched 
governance structures ex nihilo, but can merely encourage and provide resources to 
accompany domestically-driven processes of reform, and that such processes of change 
will be slow to unfold and take root. We should therefore set reasonable expectations 
for what the EU can achieve. Nevertheless, where EU policies contribute to creating 
conditions of ‘negative hybrid peace’ (Richmond 2015) or are captured and 
misappropriated by local actors in order to sustain predatory systems, there is a need to 
reflect on the appropriateness of these policies. We here draw a few lessons from the 
DRC experience, but which are also more broadly relevant for EU policies in sub-Saharan 
Africa, to address these challenges. 
1. A context focused approach 
From the outset, the EU should define its policy strategies and instruments on the basis 
of a thorough recognition and understanding of local complexities, through a critical and 
comprehensive assessment of the conditions and realities on the ground.  That is, 
context should orient the identification of policy instruments, alongside more practical 
considerations such as EU goals and interests, EU capabilities, and national reform 
strategies. Such an assessment should be mainstreamed into all aspects and throughout 
the life-time of an EU intervention in a given country. On a regular basis, performance 
of EU policies should be assessed against such context analysis in order to be able to 
identify in a timely manner if EU actions are producing unintended negative effects. Such 
context analysis should not be limited to a broad-brush analysis of conflict drivers, key 
actors, and the political, socioeconomic, and geopolitical country environment. Rather, 
it should also include network analysis; the identification of local and informal 
governance practices that may have emerged alongside the state (which, dependent on 
context, may undermine EU reform efforts or may instead point towards sources for 
local resilience on which the EU can build); the identification of ‘peace constituencies’ 
or ‘reform constituencies’, both within and outside existing state structures; and an 
understanding of the nature of governance, political interactions, and state-society 
relations in a given country. Compared to the period when EU policies in the DRC were 
first put in place, capacities within the EU to carry out such assessments have been 
developed, but the creation of the EASS and the Directorate for Conflict Prevention and 
Security provides further opportunities to consolidate such expertise over the long term. 
2. Clarifying goals 
In order for the EU to have a strategic vision guiding its policies in a given country, it 
needs to clearly define its interest and goals. These are formulated on the basis of how 
the EU sees itself as a global actor but also on what it wants to achieve in a particular 
country. This means not only identifying thematic areas in which the EU wants to 
become involved (such as health, agriculture, or the justice sector) but also a reflection 
on what the EU wants to achieve and what role it is willing and able to play. For instance, 
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does the EU envisage the role of its military conflict management missions more as 
short-term rapid response missions, bridging operations, training missions, stabilization 
missions, or full-fledged peace enforcement missions? In the DRC, the capabilities and 
length of deployment of CSDP missions were not always aligned with the broader 
mission aims, which not only limited their impact but also their local legitimacy.  
But clarifying goals also means identifying clear goalposts for assessing EU policies in a 
given country. Importantly, these should not be based merely on the internally oriented 
fulfillment of institutional benchmarks but rather on broader change objectives. From a 
human security perspective this means assessing EU policies in terms of the impact they 
have on the security of individuals in the country concerned (the implication of this is 
that political stabilization or security sector reform should not be treated as end goals 
but as a possible means to achieve the security of individuals). From a state-building 
perspective, this means, amongst others, evaluating the contribution that EU reform 
policies make not only to building state capacity but also to strengthening the local 
legitimacy of the state and its institutions.2 Shifting goalposts for the assessment of EU 
policies might contribute to better lessons being learned from past missions. 
3. Confronting domestic political blockages 
International donor organisations have had little impact on the conduct of Congo’s 
political regime, particularly since the end of the transition period. This can partly be 
attributed to limited donor coordination, but is also the result of limited coherence in 
the different policies developed by the same donor institutions, and of the absence of 
the necessary benchmarks of political conditionality. The doctrine of supporting civil 
society as an alternative to cooperation with the state (Piccolino, 2010), has produced a 
number of positive outcomes, yet has had little effect on the behavior and performance 
of the regime. While the EU has developed a broad set of political conditionality 
instruments and is considered a key player in the promotion of democracy and human 
rights (leading to the image of the EU as a normative actor in world politics), since the 
end of the transition process, the political space and human rights record of Congo has 
steadily worsened. In response to a lack of domestic political will to implement reforms, 
promote democratization, protect human rights and respect the constitution, the EU 
needs to develop stronger benchmarks and consequent sanction regimes that directly 
affect the different support networks and mechanisms of Congo’s ruling elite. It should 
be recognized, however, that the EU should be realistic in its objectives. Given the 
reduced role of the EU in the DRC, sanctions will produce limited effect if not supported 
by other donor institutions. In the absence of a political will or ability to impose 
sanctions, the EU should at a minimum reconsider how it engages with state actors that 
systematically oppose reform efforts, or when it appears that its interventions are 
producing unintended negative consequences. In some instance, it may be more 
                                                          
2 On the importance of focusing on state legitimacy in state- and peacebuilding processes, see Roberts (2008) and 
Call (2012). 
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judicious for the EU to withdraw or reorient its engagement in a particular country than 
to persist in funding reform efforts that are unlikely to produce desirable outcomes. 
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